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In this paper we focus on risk and uncertainty caused by the (1) discretionary behavior of 
regulatory bodies and (2) the instruments and mechanisms implemented to regulate public 
services in general and the postal sector in particular. In previous articles we developed an 
analytical framework for the assessment of direct and indirect regulatory governance costs in 
regulated industries. In the present paper we aim to further develop the construct of indirect costs 
of regulatory governance with respect to regulatory risks and uncertainty. The topic gains 
increasing importance in the debate on current regulatory reforms. Regulatory risks may occur 
on different levels of regulatory activities. To analyze where possible indirect costs of risk and 
uncertainty could occur we investigate a case study in the UK postal market. In postal markets 
these types of costs occur mainly with regard to universal service obligations, licensing regimes, 





regulation, regulatory risk, uncertainty, governance costs, postal sector 
 1. Introduction 
Several definitions of regulatory risk and uncertainty are described in the literature. The topic 
gains increasing importance in the debate on current regulatory reforms. In this paper we focus 
on risk and uncertainty caused by the (1) discretionary behavior of regulatory bodies and (2) the 
instruments and mechanisms implemented to regulate public services in general and the postal 
sector in particular. In previous articles (e.g. Maegli/Jaag, 2009) we developed an analytical 
framework for the assessment of regulatory governance costs in regulated industries. In this 
framework we distinguish between direct and indirect costs of regulation: Direct costs occur in 
relation with the institutional design of the regulatory framework and the behavior of actors. 
Indirect costs arise because of distorted incentives in the regulated market which result in an 
inefficient supply of goods and services. In this article we further develop the construct of 
indirect costs of regulatory governance with respect to regulatory risks and uncertainty.  
 
Regulatory risks may occur on different levels of regulatory activities. Knieps and Weiss (2008) 
for example state that as long as the competency to specify the areas and the instruments of 
sector specific regulation is delegated to regulators, a clear and economically founded regulatory 
basis will not be implemented due to conflicting interests of the regulator himself. Another 
aspect of regulatory risk and uncertainty is that today’s regulatory institutions always affect 
future regulation. By the time the characteristics of the monopolistic bottlenecks and network-
specific market powers disappear within parts (or the in whole) network (e.g. due to 
technological advances), the regulatory intervention becomes obsolete. The "phasing out" of 
sector-specific regulation may be delayed by regulator’s self-interested behavior and his interest 
in continuance. The uncertainty associated with the evolution of the regulatory framework 
affects the market participants’ decisions and hence the development of the market itself.  
 
The two main questions we would like to answer in the present article to further develop the 
framework of regulatory governance costs1 are: 
 
(1) Where do regulatory risks and uncertainties in postal regulation occur? 
(2) What are possible impacts on the development of the market? 
 
The paper will be structured as follows: After this short introduction we give a brief overview 
about regulatory risks in public services in general. In order to address the two questions we will 
outline the British postal regulatory regime before we apply the idea of regulatory risk and 
uncertainty in the postal sector and explore some practical examples in section three. In section 
four we draw some conclusions.  
                                                 
1 The costs will not be quantified in the present article.  
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2. Overview: Regulatory Governance Costs 
In this rather theoretical section we briefly line out our framework of regulatory governance 
costs and its background. The focus is set on indirect regulatory governance costs with respect to 
regulatory risk and uncertainty. 
2.1 Regulatory failure and its effects on an economy 
The original model of perfect competition leads to many desirable results: only the most efficient 
suppliers survive and produce at the lowest possible prices, prices are optimal, consumer welfare 
is at its maximum and consumers can’t get better off without making any other worse off. The 
original rationale for government intervention and the introduction of regulation in network 
industries was the correction of market failures linked to persistent monopolistic bottlenecks. 
The result of regulatory intervention (such as network access or price regulation) is ideally 
positive, thus an existing market failure is corrected. But if economic regulation is more costly 
than beneficial, it results in a overall welfare loss. Indirect costs of regulation do rarely arise 
because of the institutional design of the regulatory system, they are rather a consequence of the 
mode of regulation and the instruments implemented to achieve the regulatory objectives. The 
economic assumption was that without regulatory intervention, prices will be too high, restricting 
demand and creating excess profits; all these inefficiencies lead to high social costs and a loss of 
welfare. But it may come about that policy makers and/or regulators use wrong or imperfect 
models to guide their decisions, with a major impact on the investment incentives of firms, a 
misallocation of resources and a lowering of social welfare. The indirect negative effects of 
regulatory governance may result from a distorted static and dynamic allocation through 
improper pricing, technology choice and innovation incentives. The characteristics of these 
issues are often a result of regulatory governance respectively regulatory decisions.  
 
The overall assumption of regulatory failure is that while the objective of regulatory intervention 
is to improve market functioning, actions of regulators can have unintended negative outcomes 
as well. These outcomes may have effects on the nature of the market and the availability of 
products provided in the market, consumer choice, the level of innovation or even discourages 
firms from entering into markets. The impacts of the costs are observable in form of suboptimal 
choice of technology, a biased behavior in the market or a biased investment and innovation in 
the regulated market. 
 
In sum regulatory failure might occur because some regulatory mechanisms work adequately in a 
particular sector or country, but do not consequently result in the same outcome in another 
sector. Regulatory mechanisms do not work adequately in other markets or industries without 
any adjustment. Therefore the choice of adequate or optimal regulatory tools and mechanisms is 
often related to specific characteristics and the market structure in a particular industry or 
geographical market. 
 
Market and prices 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) argue that price regulation does not necessarily result in 
economically optimal prices in monopolies. The optimal (Ramsey) access price, for example, 
considers not only the marginal costs but also the price elasticity of demand and the 
substitutability between the full service and partially access to sub-processes. The determination 
2 
 
of Ramsey charges in practice often fails by reason of its sophisticated econometric calculation 
and the analysis of costs.2 Whenever regulators try to determine the efficient Ramsey price, they 
face considerable information asymmetries because they have to know price elasticities as well 
as the marginal costs of the operators. This information may be inaccurate or simply not 
available. Crew and Kleindorfer (2006, p.74) conclude that due to the predominant information 
asymmetries expectations from Ramsey price regulation as well as the incentive regulation 
intended to motivate operators toward more efficient pricing and production is limited. These 
instruments are not likely to result in efficient pricing. According to Knieps (2005) regulators 
should not oblige operators to rigid pricing structures since this constrains the entrepreneurial 
initiative for innovative pricing. Furthermore it is possible that more favorable pricing rules and 
tariff systems are found in the future. The development of innovative pricing schemes should be 
open to all competitors (incumbents and new entrants) and not be hindered by inadequate 
authorization procedures of regulatory authorities. If some pricing systems can be offered 
exclusively by entrants, this will constitute a structural handicap for competition and 
discrimination for other operators. Moreover, the pricing structure of a functioning market is an 
important signaling function for new competitors: If prices are cut too deep through price 
regulation it may prevent potential competitors from market entrance. 
 
Other factors associated with the development of a market are structural or institutional entry 
restrictions. A general attribute of network industries is that governments (or regulators) grant 
licenses and concessions. The aim of the licensing system is (1) to oblige the operators to render 
a certain level of public services or (2) conversely to limit the scope of the provided service. But 
who defines due to which information what the optimal and efficient number of operators in the 
market is? Depending on the criteria applied, there are different effects on competition.3 
 
Another restriction with effects on the market may be the setting of minimum wages. The setting 
of minimum wages in the German postal sector shows that potential competitors have not 
entered the German market.4 This measure and the exemption of Deutsche Post DHL from VAT 
are criticized by many competitors (especially TNT) as being market access barriers: Noting that 
market deregulation in Germany is incomplete the Dutch government has therefore already 
postponed complete liberalization twice. The example of Germany shows that not only no new 
competitors entered the market, but also the opening of a foreign postal market has been delayed. 
 
Other negative consequences of regulatory intervention may occur by weighting market power 
and distortion of competition against efficiencies in the market. Thus potentially anti-competitive 
mergers, agreements or business practices could also have positive effects on the market. While a 
merger leads to a higher concentration of firms in a market, it also lowers costs through 
economies of scale. Exclusive supply or purchase contracts may result in more efficient sales and 
improved information exchange, but also protect operators from (desired) competition.5 This 
                                                 
2 See Elsenbast (1999: 59). 
3 For example, in 2000, the Swiss government tendered four UMTS licenses in the telecom market. Even if rational 
considerations led to the perception that the number of licenses is four, this does not necessarily imply that four 
players are the optimal number of competitors. See Vantomme/ Fratini (2008) to learn more about licensing systems 
in the postal sector. 
4 See Ecorys (2008). 
5 See Oxera (2004, p.15). 
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does not imply that competition regulation in general, and merger control in particular has just 
negative effects on markets. However, the principals should take in consideration that potentially 
positive market developments may be prevented by this type of regulation. 
 
Investments and technology 
An excessive regulation with rigid social, regional or even environmental objectives might 
prevent the regulated operators from aligning their supply with the effective demand and the 
consumer needs. This may adversely affect investment activities: regulation should provide 
innovation and investment incentives in a manner that allows the companies to exploit their 
investments. As long as the incentives and protective measures are sub-optimal and don’t protect 
investments, there is less innovation and no investment in new technologies in the sector. In turn 
the market may not develop to the desired extent.  
 
An illustrative example for this kind of phenomenon is access regulation to monopolistic 
bottlenecks. Access regulation leads to a situation where access prices are under constant 
pressure by the customer. Thus access customers are interested in low prices to cut their costs 
and to offer their services below the incumbent’s price level. However, the owner of the 
monopolistic bottleneck is traditionally motivated to negotiate access prices as high as possible. 
The incentives for innovation are therefore negatively influenced by the fact that one the one 
hand the facilities’ owner is not interested in developing its facilities and pass its efficiency gains 
to rivals at a low price. At the same time, other operators or new entrants have little incentives to 
invest in their own infrastructure and potential substitutes. The problem gets even worse if 
regulators set access prices ex ante and on a low level. Depending on the characteristics of the 
industry it might happen that the more efficient market situation rather results from no regulation 
than from too rigid regulatory rules. 
 
Knieps (2005) as well as Sidak and Spulber (1998) argue that potential new competitors have no 
incentive to enter a market with a new technology, if they can buy the necessary capacity at the 
same (or even better) conditions from the incumbent and fulfill parts of the services by means of 
the existing infrastructure. This is increasingly the case, if entrants have reasons to fear that the 
new technology is substituted by more efficient solutions and therefore devaluated in a short time 
period. Furthermore the incumbent operators lack incentives to invest in the network 
infrastructure because they can hardly expect to recover their capital expenditures. 
 
2.2 A framework: Categories of regulatory governance costs6 
In our previous articles we developed a framework of regulatory governance costs. In the 
following part we give a brief overview about the definition and the categories of the different 
costs before we further develop the idea of indirect costs of regulatory governance.     
 
The original rationale for state intervention in markets (respectively in network industries) was 
the correction of market failure, i.e. (1) to stimulate competition where it is inexistent or poor, (2) 
to guarantee a minimum level of public service and (3) to assure the efficient use of the network 
infrastructure. Regulation should therefore have a positive effect on the economic and social 
                                                 
6 Section 2.2 and 2.3 rely on Maegli/ Jaag (2009). 
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welfare.7 However, governmental regulatory intervention also causes costs. In determining the 
optimal regulatory intervention it is therefore necessary – as for other projects - to analyze the 
costs as well as the benefits of regulation. Ideally the net costs of the regulatory intervention are 
negative (a surplus), otherwise an intervention shouldn’t be implemented. 
According to new institutional economics, these costs will depend upon the formal and informal 
rules among the involved actors, upon the allocation of property rights among these actors, as 
well as upon the various principal-agent or more generally contractual relationships among these 
actors. At the most general level new institutional economics reaches the conclusion that 
regulation has a cost, which can be of course optimized, but which nevertheless will be unevenly 
distributed among the actors of the broader institutional framework.8 We assume that these costs 
are inherently present in any institutional arrangements and as such are determined by 
 
(1) the institutional design and the alignment of competences (rules and actors), 
(2) the behavior of the actors, 
(3) as well as by the choice of regulatory instruments, 
 
within an institutional framework. These costs are related to tasks and transactions in regulatory 
regimes concerning bargaining and decision-making processes in policy making as well as policy 
enforcement, the control of institutional actors and the industry and the search and supply of 
information. We define regulatory governance costs as the costs of establishing9, maintaining 
and coordinating, evaluating and adjusting a regulatory arrangement.  
 
In line with Bauer (2005) and his definition of administrative burdens we describe governance 
costs in a regulatory context as the costs related to tasks performed to sustain competitive but fair 
markets, set incentives for involved actors to provide a certain level of public service, and to 
coordinate public authorities involved in regulation. 
 
In the following we distinguish between direct and indirect costs of regulation. Direct costs occur 
in relation with the institutional design of the regulatory framework and the behavior of actors. 
Whereas the indirect costs arise because of false incentives as well as regulatory risk and 
uncertainty. They finally turn out in an inefficient supply of goods and services. The amount of 
direct cost may in some cases be quantified (e.g. the annual budget of regulators or 
administration costs). In contrast to direct costs the indirect costs and their negative impacts are 
often hardly quantifiable and may have to be analyzed on a qualitative basis.10 
2.3 Direct Costs of Regulation 
As mentioned above, regulatory interventions in markets are not costless. On the one hand the 
institutional regime has to be defined. On the other hand the relevant authorities have to be set up 
and furthermore get granted with the resources which enables them to monitor markets as well as 
                                                 
7 See Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) on the theory of economic regulation.  
8 Similar work on costs and benefits of government  regulation is done by den Butter et al (2009). 
9 We will not go into the details about the costs or establishing or building up a regulatory regime in our 
explanations. 
10 See Oxera (2004, p.15). 
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the involved actors and consequently to implement the regulatory guidelines. This includes the 
creation of independent bodies which control the activities of regulatory authorities and 
coordinate different authorities involved in regulation (e.g. competition regulators vs. sector-
specific regulator) and compliance requirements. In short we distinguish three different types of 
direct regulatory governance costs11: 
 
- Monitoring costs arise because of informational asymmetries in their relationships of 
principals with their agents.  
- Compliance costs are the costs the industry face in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements. 
- Coordination costs result from multiple institutional actors involved in regulated 
industries, and that the different actors have to be coordinated. 
 
2.4 Focus: Indirect Costs of regulatory risk and uncertainty  
The important questions regarding indirect costs of regulation are whether adequate regulatory 
models and methods are implemented and if the chosen means are capable to correct a market 
failure rather than result in regulatory failure. We would like to introduce the term of regulatory 
risk and uncertainty to integrate a more dynamic perspective in the framework of regulatory 
governance costs. A crucial question related to (long-term) investments is: Who bears the risks? 
Is it the incumbent operator, the new entrants, the government or the customers? 
  
Regulatory uncertainty 
The outcomes from future regulatory decisions and its impact on the developing of markets can’t 
be predicted with certainty. This leads to regulatory uncertainty, which is a direct consequence 
not only of regulatory discretion by regulators but also of government legislation and the 
interaction of different regulatory bodies. Today’s regulatory institutions always affect future 
regulation. By the time the characteristics of the monopolistic bottlenecks and network-specific 
market powers disappear within parts (or the in whole) network (e.g. due to technological 
advances), regulatory intervention may be obsolete.12 Armstrong and Sappington (2006: 360) 
state in this context: “Consequently, although liberalization should ultimately lead to reduced 
regulatory oversight and control, more pronounced regulatory and antitrust oversight may be 
required on an interim basis to ensure that regulatory policy is tailored appropriately to the 
evolving level of competition and that competition is protected“.  
 
The process of so-called "phasing out"13 of sector-specific regulation may be delayed by 
regulator’s self-interested behavior and its interest in on-going regulation.14 It is fairly obvious 
that regulators are rarely interested in reducing their influence and cutting their own 
competences. Regulators have some bureaucratic self- interest and tend to act in their own 
                                                 
11 Direct regulatory governance costs are nor subject of the short case study in section 3 They are mentioned for the 
sake of completeness. See Maegli/ Jaag (2009) for a detailed discussion of regulatory governance costs and 
examples in the area of postal regulation. 
12 See Knieps (2007, p.191). 
13 “Phasing Out”: The period of time when the rationale for regulatory intervention is no longer tenable and the 
sector-specific regulation is likely to be abolished. 
14 See Knieps (1997). 
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interests and contrary to the intentions with which they were originally established.15 Bonardi et 
al. (2006) argue that agency decisions can have important consequences for stakeholders 
(especially firms)16 and that agencies behave differently from elected political institutions. 
Regulators are generally appointed rather than elected. Therefore they do not face the election 
constraints that typically motivate elected politicians’ behavior. Mueller (2003) and Wheaterby 
(1971) highlight that that regulatory agencies’ objective functions are multidimensional: 
regulators tend to maximize their budgets, enlarge the number of employees or enhance career 
prospects and political reputations. Wilks and Bartle (2002: 148) argue that the agencies were 
not expected to be extremely active in developing and implementing policies. However, the 
regulatory agencies have become more active than expected and have contributed to policies. 
 
Regulatory risk 
There are not only technological and systemic risks17, but also risks and uncertainties in relation 
to regulation and the socio-political goals of universal service. Oxera (2004) defines regulatory 
risk as “the risk that arises when the interaction of uncertainty and regulation changes the cost of 
financing the operations of the firm” (p. 16). Investment activities and thus the development of 
an efficient market are seriously constrained if these risks are unilaterally borne by some 
operators or even solely by the incumbent operators. 
 
The extend of regulatory risk is highly related to the modality regulators apply to the operators: 
Inconsistent decisions, new control mechanisms and the application of new regulations may 
result or lead to an increase in regulatory risk. Previous work on the issue with regard to the UK 
highlights that inconsistencies in the actions of regulators at price reviews may result in an 
increase of cost of capital.18 Furthermore, regulatory risks may occur on different levels of 
regulatory activities. Knieps and Weiss (2008) for example state that as long as the competency 
to specify the areas and the instruments of sector specific regulation is delegated to regulators a 
clear and economically founded regulatory basis will not be applied. Following their example the 
market power regulation might be either oversized or undersized or even leave areas of network 
specific market unregulated. Another example they examine is that the application of price-cap 
                                                 
15 Actors react differently to external threats, constraints and opportunities because they differ in their intrinsic 
perceptions and preferences but also because these are shaped by the specific institutional setting within which they 
interact (Scharpf 1997: 37). Crozier (1964) interprets such a behavior as “the active tendency of human agent to take 
advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means to further his own privileges” (p.194).  
16 With regard to the liberalization of former regulated industries Larson and Bunn (1999) state: “Moving from an 
technical/political orientation towards a much more commercial way of thinking and acting is a difficult process, 
involving a major re-organization towards a customer and competitor focus. This is especially true in the cases 
where full retail competition is being encouraged. Therefore, to sum up the changes that take place at the company 
level in connection with industry restructuring, we can observe that in a regulated monopolistic market, regulators 
can aim at a social optimum, as approved costs associated with this can be passed on to the final users, whereas in a 
deregulated industry, a company cannot be certain to get costs associated with 'social' initiatives covered in the price 
that the final users pay. This is a major shift in how a number of external issues, such as Conservation, Demand Side 
Management, and the Environment can be incentivised. Nevertheless, politicians seek to achieve various goals in 
these areas, and in doing so induce another area of regulatory risk, for example, the 'temporary' moratorium by the 
UK government in 1998 on all investment in gas-fired generation to help the coal industry.” 
17 Systemic risk refers to the risks imposed by interdependencies in a system or market, where the failure of a single 
unit or network of entities can cause a cascading failure. 
18 See Oxera (2004) and Bishop et al (1995).  
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regulation in a competitive section of markets may reduce economic risks but should be rejected 
because functioning market signals get disturbed.  
 
Knieps (2005) argues that many monopolistic bottleneck areas in dynamic sectors gradually 
disappear by reason of rapid technological progress. Due to the emergence of intermodal 
competition it is actually possible that the original need for regulatory intervention disappears. 
The regulatory interventions (especially its necessity) are to be reviewed regularly. In this 
context two categories of possible regulatory failures exist: First, a "false positive" occurs when 
regulators intervene in the market while competition is functioning and there is no need for 
intervention. Second, a “false negative” occurs when regulatory authorities do not intervene, 
whereas the need for regulatory intervention exists from a competition-policy point of view. 
Other potential negative impacts of regulation arise because of a lack of regulatory dynamics.19 
If regulated operators link the design of their business model too closely to regulatory rules, 
prices may be deadlocked in the long-run. Furthermore, the elimination of regulation endangers 
the companies’ means of existence.  
 
The extent of regulatory risk and uncertainty is highly related to the way regulators apply 
regulation to companies. In summary the type of regulatory regimes and the way these regimes 
are implemented are likely to influence the extent of the scope to which regulated companies are 
exposed to market uncertainties and risk.20 
3. Indirect regulatory governance costs in the British postal market  
In the following we give an overview about some elementary characteristics of postal markets to 
make the reader familiar with the sector before we describe the history and the regulatory regime 
of the UK. Finally we give examples and analyze where potential costs of regulatory uncertainty 
occur in the British regulatory regime.  
3.1 General characteristics of postal markets and regulatory risk 
In this section we briefly introduce some characteristics of the postal sector and the challenges in 
its regulation. 
 
Characteristics and economics of postal markets 
Postal markets (respectively postal operators) were historically isolated from anti-trust laws and 
regulatory intervention. They were not only state-owned but also integrated in ministries and 
therefore flush with regulatory bodies. This has changed radically with the corporate share of 
postal operators. They are nowadays subject to sector-specific as well as competition regulation. 
This occurs on the one hand because of ongoing liberalization and on the other hand because of 
the privatization of the operators in some countries. Ecorys (2008) notices that “both the 
regulatory frameworks and the mandate and resources of the regulatory authorities differ 
considerably from country to country, making it difficult to identify best practices….The 
developments in the regulatory (legal) framework have not always been driven by the regulatory 
authority in isolation, and may involve legal changes instigated by the state, and competition 
                                                 
19 See Knieps (2007). 
20 See Oxera (2004). 
8 
 
authorities (p.87).” Therefore, there are considerable difficulties to identify best practices for 
postal regulation. 
 
Nowadays postal regulatory bodies are principally concerned with tasks related to the 
supervision of the universal service, the extent of monopoly and reserved services, the quality 
and the accessibility of services, issuing licenses and concessions, access to the established 
postal infrastructure and finally price regulation.21  
 
A rather controversial issue concerning monopolistic bottlenecks is whether this type of facility 
exists in postal markets or not. From an economic perspective only the existence of bottleneck 
facilities would legitimate government intervention in form of access regulation for some 
elements of the existing postal infrastructure. Government regulation of access is not justified in 
the other parts of the network and regulation would constrain efficient negotiations of the 
involved parties.22 It becomes evident that there are different opinions and interests – 
particularly in connection with access regulation regarding the economic nature of postal 
markets. The possibility to have access to the established postal network facilitates market 
entrance for potential new competitors. From an incumbent’s perspective negotiated access could 
bring advantages as well as drawbacks: individual parts of the infrastructure or processes could 
be better charged but this results in the (new) opportunity of a selective market entrance with the 
corresponding risk of cherry picking by competitors.23 Knieps (2002) argues that there are no 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities in the primary processes (clearing, sorting and delivering mail 
items).24 The European jurisdiction supports this proposition with its court ruling:25 The 
European commission finally came to the same conclusion since there is no mandatory access 
regulation in the postal directive 2008/06/EC.  
 
Even though, there are no bottleneck facilities the daily delivery of mail items constitutes a 
natural monopoly. However, the necessary resources are not related to significant sunk 
(respectively fixed) costs; but they are rather scalable variable costs (such as labor costs) or 
disposable assets (e.g. vehicles or immovables).26 The very labor intensive sub-process of 
delivery represents approximately 55 % of the costs of mail conveyance.27 Thus the postal 
monopoly is a contestable monopoly and was successfully attacked in (partly) liberalized postal 
markets notably Sweden, Finland, Germany or the UK. As mentioned above, physical postal 
products are furthermore subject to potential substitutions through electronic communication and 
media (intermodal competition). In spite of the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks and the 
                                                 
21 See section 3.3 for examples in British postal regulation. 
22 See Knieps (2002).  
23 Cherry picking concerns the conveyance of cost-efficient mail items of business customers/ bulk mail in urban 
and dense regions. 
24This view is also supported by several European studies, e.g. Ecorys (2005).  
25The existence of monopolistic bottleneck facilities is in the early-morning newspaper delivery is negated in 1998 
in the so called “Bronner”-case. Cf. Plaut Economics (2007) and Knieps (2007 p.166). 
26 See Knieps (2007 p. 116). 
27 See Nera (2004). 
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contestability of the monopoly the ex-post and ex-ante access regulation is constantly discussed 
and claimed by the different actors and stakeholders in postal markets.28 
Regulatory Risk concerning the provision of services in postal Regulation 
Universal service obligations usually require firms to provide certain services that they otherwise 
would not supply. In general the universal service is defined from an individual consumer’s 
perspective: It is a service or product to which a consumer is entitled no matter where he lives, 
i.e., in terms of access to the service, quality and affordability. The traditional definition of the 
universal service in the postal sector implies ubiquitous delivery at a uniform price at least for 
letter mail but in many cases also parcels. Because of the characteristics of their networks, 
providers of postal universal services can even be obliged to provide services that go beyond 
postal services. These can include public missions like the nation-wide delivery of daily 
newspapers before a specific hour or to provide financial services. Especially customers in non-
densly populated areas are less attractive from a supplier’s point of view, and less likely to receive 
attractive competing offers. Second, they are also the most vulnerable to price increases. 
Therefore the provision of universal services and its financing in the future, risks in the postal 
sector concerning public interests are related to two important issues: 
 
 The provision of postal services to all customers / citizens 
 To provide the universal services at affordable prices 
 
The universal service was usually funded by the reserved area but markets are expected to be 
more and more liberalized and to avoid monopolistic market structures. Under a reserved area 
the rural (high cost) area are cross subsidized by urban (low cost) areas and as mentioned above, 
the receivers do not pay for the services they consume. Mail to rural areas is not only subsidized 
by urban areas, but also by large business customers with high volumes. As a result prices of 
postal items do not necessarily depict the actual price of delivery. PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2006) state that this fact is the source of “obligation” in the discussion about universal service 
obligation, and leads to a number of problems. In liberalized markets the cross-subsidization as a 
general way of funding universal services is no longer feasible. Because there is no reserved area 
and bulk-mail is excluded from universal services. The customers who have large volumes of 
mail sent to low-cost areas will be most attractive to entrants. New competitors that are not 
expected to provide full universal services would penetrate on the more profitable segments in 
which incumbents still offer higher prices to cross-subsidize the non-profitable segments which 
they are obliged to serve. At the worst, the funding of universal services is no longer guaranteed. 
Therefore the operator(s) that fulfill the obligation must at least be compensated for the cost of 
the universal service instead to install higher uniform tariffs to compensate market share losses in 
rural areas. Hence the regulation of postal universal services is installed to ensure the provision 
to all customers to affordable prices no matter which financing mechanism is chosen. 29   
 
                                                 
28 See de Bijl et al. (2006) for a discussion on access regulation in the postal sector. They conclude: ”Our finding 
that there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the delivery chain implies that the essential facility doctrine cannot be 
used to impose downstream access obligations upon the dominant postal operator.” 
29 See Oxera (2006) for a more detailed overview on funding mechanisms for the universal service. 
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3.2 The British Mail Market: Structure and Postal Services Regulation 
 
History  
Despite its role in the reform of other public utilities, the UK acted rather as a follower than a 
leader in the European postal liberalization debate and seemed to be less optimistic regarding the 
liberalization of postal services than in other areas of liberalization.30 
 
Historically the UK was the founder of the traditional post office model and the role of the state 
in the provision of postal services goes back to many centuries.31 The development of Roland 
Hill’s Penny Post in 1840 has been widely recognized as dominant principles of postal service 
administration and the provison of services. Organizationally the British Post Office was 
operated as a civil service department until 1969 and then got transformed in a public 
corporation.  
 
In the 1970s the overall British discussion on postal office reform emphasized rather on 
organizational matters – like the separation of telecommunications -  than on questions regarding 
the development of competition and ownership. In the late 1970s the Post Office32 went from a 
loss making to a profitable enterprise. As part of the improvement in 1985 the Post Office 
restructured its operation by splitting in our businesses: Letters, parcels, counter services and 
banking.33 The initial debate on postal reform begun in the late 1980s and the first substantial 
proposals were presented in 1991 in the wake of the “Citizens Charter” a government initiative 
on public sector reform.34 The initiative proposed the possibility of a further reduction of the 
postal monopoly and the implementation of independent regulation in the UK. Therefore, the 
government announced plans for the reduction of the monopoly and for privatization. 
Competition was expected to increase under the control of a postal regulatory agency while 
meeting the universal service obligations. While several proposals were provided35, they failed 
upon a combination of differences in the government (e.g. doubts on the possible financial losses 
of the treasury and the popularity of such a policy) as well as the governing party (which was 
worried about the reduction of universal services in rural areas and the closure of post offices). 
Moreover, trade unions waged a campaign against privatization which was backed by many 
other groups. The campaign challenged the effects of privatization and liberalization on quality 
of services and social cohesion. During this time, the Post Office management which was 
strongly in favor of privatization not only failed to ensure privatization but also missed to obtain 
greater autonomy in the public sector. In this rather uncertain situation concerning the 
development of British postal market, the government supported the European Commission’s 
proposals for the liberalization of the postal sector. In the negotiations they positioned 
themselves between the enthusiastic liberalizers and the opponents of change: The UK adhered 
                                                 
30 See McGowan (2002). 
31 See Coase (1939) und Daunton (1985). 
32 The British “Post Office” was renamed in 2000 as “Consignia”. This change was in both the public as well as the 
staff very unpopular. The organization’s name then changed again in 2002 to “Royal Mail Group plc” operational 
with three units: Royal Mail (delivering letters), Parcelforce (delivering parcels) and Post Office Limited, managing 
the nationwide network of post offices). 
33 The banking unit was sold off in 1989. See McGowan (2002). 
34 See Government of the UK (1991). 
35 Notably the green paper on postal reform in 1994. See department of Trade and Industry (1994). 
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to the primacy of universal services and uniform tariffs, supported only gradual liberalization and 
made reservations concerning the commission’s intentions for the implementations of 
competition policy in the postal sector. The post office itself had been highly skeptical regarding 
the initial proposal of the Directive as it was seen as a potential threat to the postal system in the 
UK.  
 
In 2001 The British government created a regulatory body for the postal affairs called 
Postcomm. In the same year, the Consumer Council for Postal Service - better known as 
Postwatch - was founded. It should ensure that customers can express their problems with the 
post services. 
 
In late 2001 the British Council of Ministers reached an agreement on further liberalization of 
postal services and Postcomm published a report and recommended a phased opening of the 
market with full competition implemented in 2006.36 Finally the mail market has been fully 
liberalized since January 2006 with respect to the postal services act 2000 which regulates the 
provision of postal services. The act has been revised in the end of 2003 after  several 
consultations undertaken by the British regulatory authority Postcomm.37 These include the 
definition of an industry code of practice for common operational procedures and protecting the 
integrity of mail.38  
 
3.3 Central regulatory obligations in British postal services regulation  
The Postal Services Commission (Postcomm) is an independent regulator established by the 
Postal Services Act 2000. The agency is answerable to Parliament for ensuring the provision of a 
universal postal service throughout the UK. In the original Postal Services Act there was a 
reserved area up to 100g for incoming cross-border single items. Direct mail was liberalized 
above 100g for mailings over 4000 items. The primary goal of the of the regulatory agency under 
the Postal Service act 2000 is to assure the provision of universal services. The Service has to be 
provided at affordable and uniform prices nationwide in the UK. An additional objective of the 
regulator is the promotion of competition between postal operators. Nevertheless the promotion 
of effective competition is lower-ranking than the protection of postal service user’s interests.39 
 
In sum Postcomm is in charge and active in the following areas40: 
- Protecting the universal service 
- Licensing postal operators 
- Introducing competition in the mail market 
- Regulating Royal Mail 
- Advising Government in questions concerning the post office network 
- Complaints and redress procedures41 
                                                 
36 See Postcomm (2002) . 
37 Discussions with a variety of stakeholders around the UK, including Royal Mail, Postwatch, postal operators, 
mail customers and postal sector trade unions.  
38 See Ecorys (2008). 
39 See Eccles (2009).  




Even though this is not part of postal law, the Consumers Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 
sets up the merger of the postal consumer body Postwatch with other consumer protection bodies 
in “Consumer Focus” resulting in a formal abolition of the sector specific watchdog.  
 
In the following we give a short overview on the most important regulatory issues in the British 
postal regulatory regime. 
 
The Universal Service Obligation42,43 
The regulator is responsible for the definition of the universal postal service. In June 2004, 
following a year-long review, Postcomm listed areas of postal services offered that the 
incumbent operator Roayal Mail is required to provide as universal postal services at an 
affordable flat rate. 
- priority and non-priority mail services up to 2 kilos 
- a non-priority service for parcels weighing up to 20 kilos 
- a registered and insured service a range of support services to ensure the security and 
integrity of the mail44 
- international outbound service45  
Furthermore, it was decided that Royal Mail’s universal service obligation should also include its 
Recorded (signed for) product and at least one bulk mail product. Stakeholders were consulted 
on which bulk product or products should be included in the universal service, and in June 2005, 
Postcomm announced that it had decided to include “Mailsort 1400” (first and second class) and 
“Cleanmail” (first and second class).46 
 
There are special provisions that include free services which cover free postal services for items 
specifically produced or customized for blind as well as partially sighted people. 
 
Moreover, collection and delivery of items should be provided at six days per week (without 
public holidays). This includes that at least one delivery of postal items must be provided at 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 Postcomm is not in charge for individual complaints. On an individual level the former consumer body Postwatch 
and today’s cross-sectoral consumer watchdog “Consumer Focus” helps with individual complaints about postal 
services. 
42 www.postcomm.gov.uk 
43 The provision of postal universal services has played a key role for the definition of all the European directives 
which aims simultaneously (1) to safeguard postal services as a universal service in the long run and (2) to increase 
competition. Concerning this universal service, the European directive 2008/6/EC provides that “member states shall 
ensure that users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the permanent provision of postal service of 
specified quality at all points in their territory affordable prices for all users.” Furthermore the directive describes the 
minimum requirements of the Universal Services which includes clearance and delivery (minimum 5 days per 
week), the scope of products in the universal service (clearing, sorting, transport and distribution of postal 
items/parcels up to 2/10 kilograms). 
44 Royal Mail’s re-direction (up to 12 months), Keepsafe, Poste Restante, certificate of posting and business 
collections.  
45 Royal Mail's international public tariff and international signed-for products. The UK is also subject to the 
Universal Postal Union’s requirement to deliver mail coming from abroad.  
46 Mailsort 1400 covers mail of all formats up to 2kg in weight and pre-sorted according to the location of the 1,400 
delivery offices, and Cleanmail does not require users to have sorting machines and is the "entry level" bulk mail 
product most often used by smaller businesses.  
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every working day to the home of every individual in the UK as well as at least one collection of 
postal items per working day must be done from each access point.47  
 
Licensing system 
The standard license granted by Postcomm to the operators is effective for ten years. The license 
framework sets out the standards and requirements for the licensees with the goal to “strike a 
balance between protecting customers and encouraging new postal operators to come into the 
market.”48 An individual license does enable but not require the provision of postal services. The 
framework applies to all operators and came into force on 1 January 2006 and was amended on 
16 January 2008. The license area covers the most types of mail items (unaddressed direct mail 
is not included) costing less than £1 or up to 350 grams. 
 
The mentioned standard license  
- is issued for a rolling ten years period. 49 
- requires each licensee to provide information about its own performance.  
- requires license holders to set up systems to handle customer complaints  
- introduces two codes of practice, to make sure that all operators meet common standards 
when handling mail.50  
- requires some licensees to pay an annual fee. Only those licensees with a licensed area 
turnover in excess of £10 million per annum have to pay an annual license fee, which is 
based on market share. 
 
There are additional requirements that apply to Royal Mail. As the dominant company, Royal 
Mail is subject to rigid price and service quality requirements. The incumbent Royal Mail was 
granted its current 15 year license on 23 March 2001. The special license sets out in detail Royal 
Mail's obligation to provide a universal postal service across the United Kingdom, as well as the 
service standards it is expected to meet. Royal mails license contains the following obligations 
related to competition:51 
 
- Negotiate access to royal mails network without illegitimate discriminating between users 
(condition 9 part 1) or on the basis of an access code to be agreed with postcomm 
(condition 9 part 2). 
- Avoidance of any unfair commercial advantage in favor of Royal Mail’s business or any 
other contracting party involved with the grant of network access (condition 10-2). 
- Not to disclose any information gained through the provision of access to the facilities to 
any other business of the Royal mail group (condition 10-2). 
                                                 
47 See Eccles (2009). Access points: post boxes and other facilities provided by by Royal Mail for the collection of 
postal items into its network.   
48 http://www.psc.gov.uk/postal-licences-and-operators/the-multi-operator-market/licensing-framework.html. There 
are 30 licensed operators (including Royal Mail) in the UK.  
49 Notice of ten years cannot be given until 25 March 2016, which brings other licences into line with that of Royal 
Mail. Postcomm believes this will provide operators with enough certainty to invest in the newly-opened market. 
50  (1) a mail integrity code, requiring licensees to ensure the safety and security of the mail they handle, and (2) a 
common operational procedures code, is designed to manage inter-operator issues and dealing with operational 
issues, including handling wrongly addressed and misdelivered mail. 
51 See Eccles (2009). 
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- To grant no more favorable terms of access to Royal Mail’s business than those on which 
access is made available for other persons (condition 10-5). 
- Avoidance of undue discrimination and or undue preference between persons and classes 
of persons (condition 11-2a) 
- Avoidance of excessive or predatory pricing (condition 11-2b) 
- Transparency of pricing of postal services by means of the submission to Postcomm and 
the consumer council of detailed tariffs (condition 7) 
- To provide Postcomm with copies of merger control notifications and informal 
submissions to made to the European Commission or the Office of fair Trading 
(condition 12). 
- Employment of a competition compliance officer to facilitate compliance with the 
regulatory obligations under the licence (condition 13). 
- Accounting separation as regards individual types of licensed services, other universal 
postal services and individual types of postal services outside the scope f universal 
service, and non postal services, respectively not to reduce the scope of it s regulated 
services or to offer less favorable terms to users without Postcomm’s approval 
(conditions 15 and 21). 
 
Furthermore Royal Mails services are subject to quality and performance obligations grounded 
on its license. These obligations are backed up by a compensation system for business 
customers.52 Moreover Postcomm is allowed to impose a monetary fine if it considers that Royal 
Mail has not done all reasonable efforts to achieve the service targets. 
Concerning the financing of the USO Postcomm made an assessment of whether and by how 
much providing the universal service imposes a cost or a benefit on Royal Mail in 2001. The 
incumbent operator Royal Mail is currently the only provider of the universal service in the UK 
and is required to provide the service under the terms of the license granted by Postcomm. At 
this time Postcomm came to the conclusion that Royal Mail's capability to deliver to every 
address in the UK is a commercial advantage rather than a burden. Postcomm estimated that the 
cost53of Royal Mail's universal service provision was about £81 million, representing about 
1.7% of its revenues from its mails business. This excluded any quantification of the benefits of 
being the universal service provider and was based on actual rather than efficiency costs.54 
Postcomm finally concluded that the universal service did not represent a significant burden in 
the market at that time. 
 
Access regime 
Due to its license Royal Mail is required by to provide  access to its facilities since 2001. 
Therefore Royal Mail provides downstream access to services concerning the mail conveyance 
and delivery facilities of its network. Condition 9 of Royal Mail’s license sets down the access 
                                                 
52 The compensation scheme involves  a one  percent reduction in postal charges for each percent that Royal mails 
fails below the national delivery time target and a retail compensation system to compensate customers for domestic 
first class mail failed to deliver within three working days. 
53 The cost of the USO in the UK is measured as the total potential cost of "loss-making elements" across all of 




rules for the incumbent.55 Access is open for mail consolidators, competing operators as well as 
some bulk-mail customers. The access point is usually at the delivery or sorting office for 
downstream conveyance and delivery by Royal Mail (see figure 1 below). 
 
Access prices are not strictly regulated and to negotiate between the involved parties. Access 
terms must be on prices which are based on reasonable allocations of costs and must not unduly 
discriminate between parties having access to Royal Mails Network. According to Postcomm 
prices should be based on costs of the downstream delivery. In the event negotiations fail, the 
parties can appeal Postcomm to determine the conditions in form of a direction to Royal Mail 
concerning the terms of access.56 
 
The postal act does not regulate the cost-price relation for access pricing. The price control is 
also settled in the license in condition 21 which says that access prices should be set by reference 
to a margin between the corresponding retail and access services (the so called head room 
margin).57 
 
A first access agreement was implemented in 2004 between Royal mail and its competitor UK 
Mail after a two years negotiations period and only after a preparatory intervention of Postcomm. 
The regulator regulated the minimum headroom as a minimum percentage price difference ex-
post. Today Royal Mail offers a “National Condition 9 Access Agreement” that sets out detailed 
standard terms and conditions on which access customers can feed in mail into Royal Mail’s 
network. The mail entered by the access customer must comply with the national geographic 
posting profile requirements.58 The National Condition 9 Access Agreement is based on the 
access agreement with UK Mail. The consequence of such an agreement seems to be that access 
customers which would like to hand over items only for expensive to deliver rural areas they 
have to pay more than the basic access price per item specified in the Condition 9 agreement.  
 
During 2004 another pricing access agreement was negotiated which is based on average zonal 
tariffs.  
 
                                                 
55 Condition 9 was adapted in May 2006. 
56 Eccles (2009). 
57 We do not discuss the definition of the head room margin in detail here. Please find further details in the 
appendix. 
58 Each posting handed over by the customer must contain items to for delivery for 31 postcode areas defined as 
mandatory and must also hand over  postal items for delivery to a minimum of 60 postcode areas. Based on this 




Figure 1: Access Arrangements in the UK59  
 
Price controls 
Condition 21 of Royal Mail’s license defines the pricing framework within which Royal mail is 
required to operate. The current price controls apply during 2006-2010 and recently Postcomm 
decided not to change the system after 2010. The price control provision in condition 21 includes 
a complex formula for royal mails retail prices. The price control is in the form of an RPI-X, 
across two different baskets.60 Eccles (2009) lines out that it is “important to note that the 
pricing provisions contain no reference to the price being geard or oriented to costs as required 
by the relevant provision of the EU Postal Services Directive 97/67 and the further amending 
Directive 2008/6/EC (p. 347)”.Based on the license Royal mail is obtained to apply affordable 
prices and a uniform tariff for services within the universal service. The price control applies not 
only to products within the universal service but also to all regulated services. E.g. the price 
control mechanisms are also applied to bulk-mail services outside the USO. Due to condition 7 
Royal Mail is obliged to take steps to ensure transparency of its prices and not to offer discounts 
without submitting Postcomm and the consumer council details of the tariffs.  
 
All license holders in the UK are required to conduct accounts which separate revenue and costs 
in relation with postal services within the licensed area from other operations and to provide the 
information on annually basis to Postcomm.   
 
3.4 Indirect Regulatory Governance Costs in the UK 
In the following we give some examples in the regulatory area which raise regulatory risk and 
uncertainty in the British postal market. In general it occurs in combination with unclear 
regulatory ruling ending in juridical proceedings, too rigid regulatory regimes that hinder the 
development of markets or unforeseen consequences of regulation. 
 
                                                 
59 Source Hooper Report (2008, p.28). 
60 See Royal Mail’s licence for further details. 
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Universal Service Obligation 
After the full market opening in the UK the universal service essentially remained as it was 
before and the regulatory body PostComm was assigned new, extensive competencies. The 
definition of the USO in the UK is more extensive than required in the directive. Royal mail 
therfore claims  that the definition of the USO should be narrowed. Futhermore Royal Mail states 
that stamp prices should cover economic costs of providiung the service. TNT argues that the 
number of days for deliveries and and collection could be reduced to five days but that the 
decision should be left to Royal Mail. The other major competitor UK Mail is also in favor of a 
reduction of the delivery days and mentions that there is a potential opportunity to reduce the 
costs of the USO.61   
 
The British postal market is thus now the most strictly regulated in Europe and its universal 
service provider the Royal Mail is the postal service with the biggest financial difficulties. The 
network of postal outlets was outsourced to Post Office Ltd. many years before. It is operated by 
franchisees and currently runs a deficit despite the fact that it receives state subsidies and offers 
no payment services. 
The definition of the USO and its financing is under discussion because Royal Mails 2007/2008 
report shows an estimated loss of £100 million for the universal service62 and because Royal 
Mail is exempted from VAT for its universal services. Therefore the competitor TNT filed a 
court complaint to dispute the validity of the VAT exemption from services provided by Royal 
Mail, saying it provided comparable services but was subject to VAT. The European Court of 
Justice took the view that the services provided by the two companies were not comparable and 
that Royal Mail supplies postal services under a legal regime which is substantially different 
from that of an operator such as TNT. Royal Mail was designated in 2001 as the only universal 
postal service provider in the United Kingdom. The UK postal market was later fully liberalized 
in 2006, without affecting the status and obligations of Royal Mail, the court said.63 The VAT 
distortion in the British mail Market almost does not apply in the access case but nevertheless it 
constitutes a key barrier which hinders end-to-end competition.64  
Access: 
The British regulator Postcomm enforced a de facto regulation of access to Royal Mail’s 
network. In Britain competition is less intensive than in other liberalized postal markets - there 
are so far hardly any new competitors across all stages of the postal value chain. Instead, the 
trend in consolidation (collection and sorting) is growing faster than in other European markets. 
Mail items are handed over to Royal Mail’s network for delivery at low prices. This kind of 
access regulation not only strengthens the delivery organization but also weakens the position of 
Royal Mail in the upstream market. This example shows that the original interventions may 
cause a follow-up regulatory intervention. These follow-ups which are implemented to correct 
                                                 
61 See Ecorys (2008, p.960ff) for detailed statements of   the operators concerning the definition of the USO in the 
UK.. 
62 See Ecorys (2008). 
63 See Decision: Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-357/07. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=CJE/09/32&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=de 
64 See the Hooper Report (2008). 
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the failure of a previous regulatory action can even be stronger than the original intervention. 
The combination of mandatory access and headroom regulation was originally intended to 
accelerate the evolution of competition. Postcomm estimated that new entrants would be likely to 
use the opportunity of access to royal mail’s facilities to realize economies of scales which in 
turn facilitates the development of their own end-to-end networks. The Hooper Report (2008) 
states that the British access regime finally prevented other operators from building their own 
networks because the headroom margin approach lead to the rather low access prices. TNT 
stopped its own end-to-end delivery and concentrates in the UK on the consolidation Business 
again. Even if the overall mail volumes in Britain are declining the other operators succeeded to 
increase their volumes in the upstream markets.65 Approximately every third letter in the UK is 
collected by competitors of Royal Mail but finally handed over to Royal Mail for the delivery. 
Royal Mails access volumes increased in 2008 about percent. Due to the headroom margin 
system Royal Mail loses money on these items. Therefore, they call for an adequate regulation 
which takes the changed situation in the sector in consideration. 
 
To resolve risks concerning claims about unfair commercial advantages and as a reaction on a 
number of complaints regarding discriminatory behavior (as regards negotiations as well as 
Condition 10 of Royal Mail’s license), royal mail established its separated wholesale unit in 
early 2006. The unit was formerly based within the regulatory affairs department of Royal Mail 
and Postcomm claimed the lack of physical separation of Royal Mail’s wholesale unit and retail 
teams or of no separation of data systems, accounts, and security systems.66 
 
Another issues concerning access agreement is the length of negotiations of the parties. TNT for 
example states that one of the most important reasons to opt for the standard national access 
agreement instead of negotiating its own condition with Royal Mail was that with a potential 
long period of negotiations could be avoided. In turn this is a compromise where TNT chose to 
reduce the time to market instead of optimizing its access conditions. 
 
Concerning the development of end-to-end competition the Hooper Report (2008) concludes that 
there is uncertainty about the future development of the market which makes it difficult for 
operators to assess the likely return on the investment. The consequences of falling volumes, 
developments in new technologies and regulation at the end of current price control are difficult 
to predict. Furthermore, some operators claim that any investment in an end-to-end delivery 
network would be threatened by the ability of Royal Mail to hamper competition in the future.67    
  
Price Control 
The Ecorys Study (2008) includes a survey which asked the three biggest competitors (among 
other things) about their opinion concerning the UK price control. The statements are 
fundamentally different. Whilst royal Mail states that it is prevented from competing with the 
other operators from the pricing perspective. UK mail and TNT claim that Royal Mail’s pricing 
policies are irrational and aimed to squeezing opportunities for competitors rather than 
                                                 
65 The overall reduction of the letter volume was 3.2 (5,5) percent in 2007 (2008) and Royal Mail expects a further 
decrease up to 10 percent in 2010. 
66 See Ecccles (2009). Royal mail was in contravention of condition 10-2 of its license which says not to disclose 
any information gained through the provision of access to the facilities to any other business of Royal Mail. 
67 See Hooper Report (2008, p. 155). 
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recognizing needs of customers. Therefore TNT filed a complaint with Postcomm concerning the 
pricing policies of Royal Mail. In their conclusion on pricing Ecorys (2008) then states that the 
main battle field in the next few years will be the pricing policies of Royal Mail and how 
Postcomm deals with the issue. 
 
Other sources of risk and uncertainty 
In order to analyze the situation of the universal service an independent Review with the title 
“Modernise or decline- Policies to maintain universal services in the United Kingdom” was 
conducted. The so called Hooper Report (2008) shade light on diverse risks and uncertainties 
concerning the future of UK’s postal services. With respect to the shape of the sector-specific 
Regulator Postcomm and the regulatory regime the report proposes: “Effective competition can 
help realize a positive future. A new regulatory regime is needed to place postal regulation 
within the broader context of the communications market. (p.15)” Therefore the report 
recommends not only to transform the self-contained Postcomm to Ofcom68  but also to conduct 
a comprehensive analysis about the postal markets and to analyze the extent to which Royal Mail 
has market power in the different segments. Following the report, the moving to a new system of 
regulation would first require a greater clarity of royal mails costs. However, even though the 
report lines out a couple of other suggestion to improve the situation in the British mail market 
and of Royal Mail itself in order to reduce risks concerning the USO it also rises uncertainty 
because it proposes radical changes in the regulatory regime which affect the operator’s 
businesses and therefore their return on investment in the long-run.  
4. Conclusions 
In the theoretical chapter we outline the framework of regulatory governance costs with focus on 
the indirect cost of regulatory risk and uncertainty. These costs occur mainly in combination with 
unclear regulatory ruling ending in juridical proceedings, too rigid regulatory regimes that hinder 
the development of markets or unforeseen consequences of regulation. 
 
In postal markets these types of costs occur mainly with regard to universal service obligations, 
licensing regimes, access regulation, price control, structural market entry barriers and 
adaptations of regulation. 
- Concerning the universal service obligation: The risk and uncertainty are related to the 
scope and the definition of the universal service and the adequate financing mechanisms 
in the long term. Another question is whether the Universal service does rather constitute 
a burden or a competitive advantage for the one how is designated to provide it. 
- Licensing Regimes are subject to risk and uncertainties in case they bear incisive license 
requirements (e.g. far-reaching delivery requirements).69The question to ask is whether 
the licensing regime is fair for all operators or if some operators are worse off than others 
due to asymmetric regulations. 
- Access: In the access-regime the risk and uncertainty occurs concerning the type of 
access regulation and the tariff principals. It is to analyze whether the chosen regime 
promotes the original goal of the regulatory intervention (e.g. end-to-end competition) 
                                                 
68 Ofcom is the independent regulator and competition authority for the communications industries in the UK. 
69 Predominantly for new entrants but also incumbent operators. 
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and how different business models of operators are affected by the particular regime. An 
important question is whether the chosen regime puts the financing the universal service 
at risk (e.g. cherry picking).  
- Price Control: It is to analyze whether the tariff system is non discriminatory for all 
operators as well as the end customers. Or does the Tariff system hinder or promote 
certain business models which in turn affect the financial situation of the operators? 
- Structural market entry barriers: These risk and uncertainties mainly concern new 
entrants. They occur e.g. in case of discriminatory VAT-regimes,  
- Adaption of regulation affects the cost of capital of the operators because of the 
uncertainty on how the regulators behave as well as on how regulatory framework 
evolves and what the effects on their business are. 
  
Following the statements above we come to the conclusion that there exist regulatory risks and 
uncertainties not only concerning the maintenance of public interests but also for the postal 
operators (for new entrants as well as for incumbents). 
 
A particular weakness of our study is that we so far just rely on secondary data and the analysis 
and interpretation of the British mail market is grounded on desktop research. After this 
preliminary study we therefore plan to conduct empirical qualitative research to learn more about 
regulatory governance costs and to improve our framework. Moreover we would like to 
investigate on how these different costs (including direct as well as indirect costs of regulatory 
governance) are perceived in practice by the different actors involved with postal regulation. The 
insights about the costs and its impact on market evolution will be useful to analyze regulatory 
policies in postal markets as well as in other network industries (certainly with respect to the 
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